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Patent BoxesIntellectual property accounts for a growing share of ﬁrms' assets. It is more mobile than other forms of capital,
and could be used by ﬁrms to shift income offshore and to reduce their corporate income tax liability. We
consider how inﬂuential corporate income taxes are in determining where ﬁrms choose to legally own
intellectual property. We estimate a mixed (or random coefﬁcients) logit model that incorporates important
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in ﬁrms' location choices. We obtain estimates of the full set of location
speciﬁc tax elasticities and conduct ex ante analysis of how the location of ownership of intellectual property will
respond to changes in tax policy. We ﬁnd that recent reforms that give preferential tax treatment to income
arising from patents are likely to have signiﬁcant effects on the location of ownership of new intellectual
property, and could lead to substantial reductions in tax revenue.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
The growing importance of intellectual property as a factor in
production,1 and concern that it is easier for ﬁrms to shift income
from this source than it is from others, presents challenges for tax
design. Firms can and do position their intellectual property with a
view to reducing tax liabilities. However, despite these concerns, ﬁrms
do not by and large locate the legal ownership of intellectual property
in the lowest tax countries, and corporate income taxes still raise
considerable amounts of revenue in most developed countries. In
this paper we address the question of how inﬂuential corporate income
taxes are in determining where ﬁrms choose to legally register
ownership of an important form of intangible assets, patents.
Our contribution is to extend the empirical literature on public
policy and ﬁrm location choice by introducing new methods to this
area of public economics. We estimate a mixed (or random coefﬁcients)
logit model that incorporates both observed and unobservedn_m@ifs.org.uk (H. Miller),
of intellectual property and its
themost important commercial
tes that in the UK knowledge
0s and is nowabout 50%higher.
. This is an open access article underheterogeneity in ﬁrms' location choices (see inter alia, Berry et al. (1995,
2004), Nevo (2001) and Train (2003)). A key strength of this approach
is that it allows us to compute own and cross tax elasticities across loca-
tions that reﬂect patterns of correlation in observed choices in the data,
and therefore to capture more realistic substitution patterns than stan-
dard logit models. Our estimates allow us to conduct ex ante analysis of
how the location of ownership of intellectual property will respond to
changes in policy. We use our estimates to simulate responses to recent
policy reforms that provide preferential tax treatment to income arising
from patents. We ﬁnd that these reforms are likely to have signiﬁcant ef-
fects on the location of ownership of new intellectual property, and could
lead to substantial reductions in tax revenue. Our estimates could be used
to simulate a wide range of other counterfactual situations.
We use comprehensive panel data on all patent applicationsmade to
the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) by a large number of innovative
European ﬁrms over 1985–2005. A patent is a legal document that
grants a ﬁrm the exclusive rights to use or licence a novel technology
for a speciﬁed period of time. A ﬁrm can register legal ownership of a
patent in a subsidiary that is located in a country different to the ﬁrm's
headquarters, different to the locationwhere the underlying technology
was created and different to the locationwhere the intellectual property
will be applied. Lipsey (2010) notes that, inmultinational ﬁrms, intangi-
ble assets “have no clear geographical location, but only a nominal location
determined by the parent company's tax or legal strategies.” For example,the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
Fig. 1. Share of patent applicationsmade by subsidiaries of UK parentﬁrms that are located offshore and separately from innovative activity. Notes: The bars show the share of total patent
applications made by subsidiaries of UK parent ﬁrms where the subsidiary is located outside of the UK, and is not in a country where associated innovative activity was carried out. Low
(high) tax countries are deﬁned as those locations that have a statutory tax rate less (greater) than the UK.
2 When determining the correct transfer price there are both conceptual difﬁculties— it
can be hard to separately determine the value that arises from integrated activities that
take place across countries, and practical difﬁculties — ﬁrms have more information than
tax authorities and an incentive to minimise their tax liability.
3 Figure based on patent applicationsmade by applicants located in Bahamas, Barbados,
Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco,
Netherlands Antilles, Panama or Singapore.
13R. Grifﬁth et al. / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 12–23Fig. 1 shows the share of patent applications made by UK parent ﬁrms
where the legal ownership is registered outside of the UK and in a
separate place to where the underlying innovative activity occurred.
This share has increased six-fold over the past two decades. The largest
proportion has gone to countries that have a lower tax rate than the UK,
but the amount going to countries with a higher tax rate has also
increased.
We model the impact of tax on where ﬁrms choose to locate the
legal ownership of patents. Tax could inﬂuence this decision because
the legal ownership of the patent will be one of the determinants of
where the income derived from the patent is taxed. The proﬁts earned
from the exploitation of intellectual property will be the result of a
number of activities, including the research and development (R&D)
investment undertaken to create the new idea, the ﬁnancing of this
investment and the subsequent commercialisation. When these activi-
ties take place inmultiple countries, as is often the case for multination-
al ﬁrms, the returns must be allocated to individual jurisdictions for tax
purposes.
Firms have an incentive to arrange their activities in such away that,
all else equal, proﬁts accrue in the country in which they would pay
the lowest tax. There are a number of strategies that can be used to
achieve this. Such strategies commonly require that the income earned
from exploiting intellectual property accrues outside of the country in
which the underlying R&D took place. One way to achieve this is
through contract R&D. For example, a subsidiary in a relatively low tax
country may ﬁnance (and bear the risk for) R&D activities that are
contracted to a related subsidiary in a higher tax country (possibly
with the beneﬁt of R&D tax incentives and access to high skills levels).
The contract will specify the payment to be made for the R&D activities
(commonly equal to the costs incurred plus an arm's length mark-up).
Returns above this payment, either from using the technology directly
or from licensing it, will accrue to the subsidiary that bore the ﬁnancial
risk. There is a tax advantage to this strategy if the true value of the R&D
activities is less than the price paid for the contract R&D. A similar result
may be achieved through the use of a cost sharing agreement that
speciﬁes how subsidiaries will share the costs, risks and returns
associated with an R&D project. Such agreements may be designed
such that the right to exploit and capture the returns from a technology
accrues to a subsidiary in a low tax country. The strategies available to a
ﬁrm depend on how the ﬁrm is organised and on the precise tax rules
they are subject to (Finnerty et al. (2007)).Tax rules limit a ﬁrm's ability to manipulate where income arises for
tax purposes. Shifting income typically requires that payments made to
compensate the company that conducts the R&D, or royalties made for
the use of a technology, are at preferential prices. There are transfer
pricing rules that aim to enforce the principle that the prices of intra-
ﬁrm transactions are set as if they had occurred between unrelated
parties— this is the arm's length principle. However, these transactions
often do not have market counterparts, which means that ﬁrms may
have opportunities to set the prices of related transactions in such a
way as to reduce tax liability.2 Tax rules, including those that dictate
how a ﬁrm can allocate the returns to innovative activities, differ across
European countries and are different to those faced by US multina-
tionals. For example, countries differ on the acceptable methods used
to calculate payments for contracted R&D services, and where there
are cost sharing agreements, countries differ in the requirements over
whether all subsidiaries involved in the agreement need be engaged
in R&D (in contrast to the US, not all European countries allow holding
companies in low tax locations to be part of cost sharing agreements).
The corporate tax rate is likely to be an important determinant of the
location in which a ﬁrm chooses to hold legal ownership of intellectual
property. However, it is unlikely to be the only factor; we would not
expect all intellectual property to be legally registered in the lowest
tax countries. Indeed, legal ownership of patents is rarely in the set of
small countries that are often considered to be tax havens. The patents
that are legally owned in such countries accounted for fewer than 0.5%
of all patent applications made to the European Patent Ofﬁce over the
period 2001–2005, and many of those are unrelated to European
ﬁrms.3 This could be due, at least in part, to the operation of Controlled
Foreign Company (CFC) regimes, which effectively seeks to tax income
at the higher home country tax rate if it is deemed to be located in a low
tax country for tax purposes. More generally, there may be characteris-
tics of a location over and above its corporate tax rate that ﬁrms value.
For example, the strength of intellectual property rights protection
and market size might play a role, and, all else equal, ﬁrms may
14 R. Grifﬁth et al. / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 12–23be more likely to co-locate ownership of intellectual property with
associated real innovative activity due to externalities from co-location.
There is likely to be a large degree of heterogeneity in how respon-
sive ﬁrms are to taxwhen decidingwhere to locate the legal ownership
of their intellectual property; a number of papers have emphasised
the importance of incorporating heterogeneity in ﬁrms' decisions
(Melitz (2003), Bernard et al. (2007a, 2007b), Krautheim and
Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2011)). This heterogeneity will arise for a number
of reasons, some of which relate to observable factors, and others that
relate to factors unobserved by the econometrician. For example, ﬁrms
are likely to be more sensitive to tax when choosing the location in
which to legally own patents with a relatively high expected value
(Becker and Fuest (2007), Bohm et al. (2012)). Firms are also likely to
be differentially responsive to tax due to differences in their
organisational structures. Their existing network of subsidiaries, the
proﬁciency of their tax department and the tax strategies they are
able to employ for managing income from intellectual property will
play a role. Firms with headquarters in different countries might
respond differently if countries differ in the stringency of their
tax rules and in the effectiveness with which they are applied. Firms
operating in somemarkets or using certain technologies might respond
differently, because, for example, transfer pricing rules may be easier to
circumvent for ﬁrms operating in markets where a high share of
transactions are intra-ﬁrm meaning it is difﬁcult for tax authorities to
accurately assesswhat is a fair market price. Both ﬁrm size and industry
have been highlighted as important in the context of ﬁrm decision
making over how to organise offshore activities (Graham and Tucker
(2006) and Desai et al. (2006)). Indeed, the value of a patent, the
relative attractiveness of a location and a ﬁrm's strategies and
organisational structures are likely to vary across industries and,
within industries, across ﬁrms.
Our work relates to several papers in the literature. Most closely
related, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) and Karkinsky and Riedel (2012)
estimate the relationship between corporate tax and, respectively, the
quantity of intangible assets and the number of patent applications
made by subsidiaries located in each of a number of European countries.
Also related is Ernst and Spengel (2011) who estimate the impact of
R&D tax incentives and corporate tax on patenting. In common with
these papers, we are interested in the relationship between corporate
tax and where ﬁrms choose to locate intellectual property. We extend
this literature by estimating a choice model that allows us to compute
the full set of own tax and cross tax elasticities and which allows us to
carry out ex ante analysis of how location decisions will respond to
potential policy changes. Our work is also related to Cohen (2012),
which uses a discrete choice framework to study how the design of US
state tax rules inﬂuence US ﬁrms' decisions over in which state to
incorporate.
There is a considerable literature in the Hall and Jorgenson (1967)
tradition that considers the impact of taxes on production activity and
on the location of R&D. Hines (1996, 1999) and Devereux (2006)
provide surveys of the empirical literature. This literature ﬁnds that,
despite the many factors that will inﬂuence a ﬁrm's location decision,
tax exerts a signiﬁcant effect on location choices. Hines and Jaffe
(2001) show that tax affects the location of ﬁrms' innovative activities
within USmultinational groups.Most relevant for our analysis, previous
work has highlighted the role that intangible assets play in allowing
ﬁrms to organise their activities with a view to reducing their tax
burden (Altshuler and Grubert (2006)). Empirical studies provide
indirect evidence of tax avoidance by, for example showing that ﬁrms
have relatively high proﬁtability in low tax countries (Grubert and
Mutti (1991), Hines and Rice (1994)) and that the share of royalty
payments associated with low tax countries is higher than expected
(Grubert and Mutti (2009)). Grubert (2003) formalises how intangible
assets can be used to shift income and ﬁnds that about half of the in-
come shifted from high-tax to low-tax countries by US manufacturing
ﬁrms can be accounted for by income from R&D linked intangibles.The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline a
model of a ﬁrm's decision over where to locate the legal ownership of
a patent. In Section 3 we describe the data we use to estimate the
model. Section 4 presents the estimated coefﬁcients and the tax
elasticities between locations. An example of how the model can be
used to conduct policy simulations is given in Section 5, where we
consider the impact of recent reforms that reduce the tax rate for
incomederived frompatents. A ﬁnal section summarises and concludes.
2. Firm behaviour
When a ﬁrm generates a new idea, it expects to earn a stream of
income on the application of that idea in the future. Ideas will vary
both in their expected values and in the number of patents they give
rise to (some will lead to one patent and some will lead to many). A
ﬁrm faces the decision overwhere to initially locate the legal ownership
of each patent. It will make this decision based, in part, on the rate of tax
that it expects to face on income generated by the use of the patent in
the future. Unobserved attributes of ideas are likely to be crucial, and
potentially could generate correlations in patent location decisions.
The ﬁrm will also take account of other characteristics of locations
that it may value, for example, whether the real innovative activity
associated with that intellectual property is also located there, the
potential size of the market (if it also expects to commercialise the
idea in that location), intellectual property rights' protection, technolog-
ical condition, and many other location speciﬁc factors, at least some
of which are likely to be unobserved by the econometrician. The
importance of these location characteristic are likely to vary across
ideas. For example, high value ideas may be more tax sensitive and
the importance of intellectual property protection may differ across
industries.
We develop a tractable empirical model that captures these
determinants of location choice.
2.1. Firm payoffs
We specify a model in which a parent ﬁrm decides where to locate
the legal ownership of each of its patents. Firms, indexed f = 1,…,F,
realise ideas, indexed i=1,…,I. Ideas are assumed to arise exogenously
over time, indexed t. Each idea can yield a single patent or a group of
related patents; patents are indexed p= 1,…,P. We model the country,
indexed j = 1,…,J, in which the parent ﬁrm decides to locate the legal
ownership of each patent, allowing for correlation in decisions between
related patents (those that are part of the same idea). We consider all
patents taken out by a parent ﬁrm that are technologically related in a
quarter as part of the same idea; the precise deﬁnition of an idea is
given in Section 1.
For each patent, the parent ﬁrm chooses the location that yields the
highest payoff. The payoff the parent ﬁrm gets from choosing a location
depends on the tax rate it expects to face, τfjt, the quality of the idea, qi,
whether any research activity that gave rise to the idea is located there,
aijt, the strength of the country's intellectual property rights protection,
the size of the local market (measured as GDP), and the level of
technological innovativeness (measured as total annual business R&D
expenditure as a share of GDP), captured in the vector xjt. Crucially,
we also allow location choice to depend on unobserved characteristics
of both the idea and the location. We allow the impact of all observed
and unobserved factors to vary across medium and large ﬁrms and for
technologies in different industries; the subscript r = 1,…,R denotes
the industry–ﬁrm size category an idea belongs to.
We assume the payoff that ﬁrm f obtains from placing legal
ownership of patent p (belonging to idea i) in location j takes the form,
πpjt ¼ αiτfjt þ βiaijt þ γrxjt þ ξrj þ ϵpjt : ð1Þ
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observable and unobservable idea characteristics,
αi ¼ αr þ αrqi þ στr ηi; ηi∼N 0;1ð Þ; ð2Þ
βi ¼ βr þ σarνi; νi∼N 0;1ð Þ: ð3Þ
We assume that ηi and νi are uncorrelatedwith each other andwith the
other covariates, and that the additive shock ϵpjt is distributed iid type I
extreme value. ξrj is a location–industry–ﬁrm size ﬁxed effect. The ﬁrm
chooses option j⁎ if,
πp jt Nπpjt ∀ j≠ j

: ð4Þ
The resulting choice model is a mixed logit with unknown parameters
αr ;αr ;σ
τ
r ;βr ;σ
a
r ;γr ; ξrjÞ

.
The tax rate τfjt varies across ﬁrms, because the tax system in a ﬁrm's
residence jurisdiction may interact with the rules of the countries in
which it is considering locating ownership of a patent through the
operation of Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules. We use the tax
rate dated t, making the assumption that when a ﬁrm chooses the
location of a patent it expects that the current tax regime will apply in
the future.
The tax parameter, αi, is at the idea level. We allow it to vary with an
observed measure of idea quality, qi. Patents that are part of a high
quality idea are likely to have a higher expected value, and thus their
location may be more sensitive to tax. We also allow the idea level tax
parameter to include a random term ηi. This captures all components
of ideas that determine the responsiveness of location choice to tax
and are observed by the parent ﬁrm but not by the econometrician.
For instance, the quality variable is likely to be an imperfect measure
of the expected value of the idea. There could be other factors that
are correlated with the idea's expected values, unobserved by us, but
available to ﬁrms, which will be captured by ηi.
The parameter αr captures the mean marginal effect of tax on
the payoff, αr tells us how this varies with the observed quality of
the idea, and σrτ tells us the standard deviation in the effect of tax on
the payoff. These parameters all have an r subscript, indicating that we
allow both the mean impact of tax on the payoff, and how this varies
with both observed quality and unobservables, to vary across industries
and across ﬁrm size.
Similarly, we model the parameter on real innovative activity, βi, as
an idea level random coefﬁcient; the impact of real innovative activity
on the payoff function varies across patents with the random term νi.
Firms may value locating the legal ownership of intellectual property
in the same country as it was created, and the strength of this motive
is likely to vary across ideas.
A central assumption of the standardmultinomial logit model is that
the stochastic error term associated with the payoff from a particular
option (in our case the decision to locate ownership of a patent in a
particular location) has an iid type I extreme value distribution. This
rules out correlation in latent payoffs. This assumption leads to a closed
form solution for the location choice probabilities, which is empirically
convenient. However, it is restrictive, leading the multinomial logit
model to imply restrictive substitution patterns. In particular, the lack
of correlation in payoffs endows the model with the independence of
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property.
Random coefﬁcients allow us to relax the assumption of zero
correlation in payoffs inherent in the standard multinomial logit
model. In particular, we group patents into ideas and allow some
of the parameters in the payoff function (those on tax and on real
innovative activity) to be idea speciﬁc. We model these idea speciﬁc
preference parameters as random coefﬁcients — which leads to the
mixed logit model. An implication of including random coefﬁcients at
the level of an idea is that it allows for correlation in the payoffs bothacross location options for a given patent, and across patent locating
decisions for all patents in a given idea (Train, 2003); the covariance
between the payoff of locating patent p in location j and locating
another patent p′ associated with the same idea in location k is given
by: Cov πpjt; πp′kt
  ¼ στr τfjtτfkt þ σar aijtaikt . Therefore, although the
model still includes an iid type I extreme value term, it also contains
other unobservable components that allow for rich correlations, the
nature of which is in large part determined by the data (along with
the distributional assumptions we make). An important consequence
of allowing for such correlations is that the IIA property is not present
in the mixed logit model, allowing the model to capture much more
ﬂexible substitution patterns (see Berry et al. (1995, 2004), Nevo
(2001) and Train (2003)).
We include in xjt a number of time varying location characteristics
that ﬁrms are likely to value when choosing where to locate the legal
ownership of intellectual property. However, there are likely to be
other location characteristics that ﬁrms value that we do not observe.
To capture these we include location–industry–ﬁrm size ﬁxed effects,
ξrj. These will control for location speciﬁc costs, such as the legal costs
associated with setting up a subsidiary, or location speciﬁc beneﬁts,
such as government provided public goods, the relevance of which
might differ for ﬁrms of different size or industry.
Note that there may be many other patent, idea or ﬁrm speciﬁc
factors that do not vary across location but that do inﬂuence the
costs or beneﬁts of a location. However, because these do not vary
across location they will not enter the location choice decision, and
therefore are not explicitly entered into Eq. (1); including them
would lead to an observationally equivalent choice model, because
they would drop out when payoff comparisons are made across
locations.
2.2. Choice probabilities
The choice model described above implies that the probability that
legal ownership of patent p is located in location j, conditional on
realisations of the idea speciﬁc variables ηi and νi, takes the form,
ρpjt ηi;νi
  ¼ e
αr þ αrqi þ στr ηi
 
τfjt þ βr þ σarνi
 
aijt þ γrxjt þ ξrj
X
k
e αr þ αrqi þ σ
τ
r ηi
 
τfkt þ βr þ σarνi
 
aikt þ γrxkt þ ξrk :
ð5Þ
The unconditional probability is obtained by integrating out the unob-
servable idea speciﬁc random terms,
Ppjt ¼ ∫ ρpjt ηi;νi
 
dF ηi;νi
 
: ð6Þ
Eq. (6) can be used to compute the impact of marginal changes in
tax on location choice probabilities. For instance, the elasticity of
the probability that legal ownership of patent p is in location j
with respect to a marginal change in the tax rate in location k is
given by,
epjkt ¼
∂Ppjt
∂τikt
τikt
Ppjt
¼ ∫ ∂ρpjt ηi;νi
 
∂τikt
dF ηi;νi
  τikt
∫ ρpjt ηi;νi
 
dF ηi;νi
  : ð7Þ
We compute the elasticity of the share of patents with legal owner-
ship in location j with respect to the statutory tax rate in location k
in year t (τkt), by aggregating across Eq. (7) for all the patents that
arose in year t (denote this set of patents ϒt). We explicitly account
for the operation of CFC regimes (see Section 2 for a description of
how CFC regimes work). For a patent owned by a ﬁrm resident in a
country that has a CFC regime, and that deems country k as a low
tax jurisdiction, changes in the statutory tax rate of location k
should have no bearing on their location probabilities. Deﬁne an in-
dicator variable Dpjt, where Dpjt =0 if patent p at time t is subject to
CFC rules which bind in location j, and Dpjt = 1 otherwise. We can
4 Inmost EPO applications there is one applicant. For the handful of patent applications
that are ﬁled bymultiple applicants inmultiple locationswe randomly select one of them.
5 A small number of patent applications (0.07% of those ﬁled by all applicants in the 15
countries we consider) have missing inventor data. We exclude these applications.
6 This is different to data on patents ﬁled at the US Patent and Trademark Ofﬁce for
which the inventors are the patent applicants.
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with respect to tax in location k in year t as,
Ejkt ¼ ∫
X
p∈ϒt
Dpkt
∂ρpjt ηi;νi
 
∂τikt
dF ηi;νi
  τkt
∫
X
p∈ϒt
ρpjt ηi;νi
 
dF ηi;νi
  : ð8Þ
2.3. Identiﬁcation
Our primary interest lies in pinning down the ceteris paribus impact
of a change in the corporate tax rate set by any one country on the
shares of patent applications made by subsidiaries in both that and in
alternative locations. To do this we must consistently estimate the
parameters of the payoff function outlined in Eqs. (1)–(4), and in partic-
ular the parameters governing the marginal impact of tax on the payoff
associated with selecting a location, which are modelled as random
coefﬁcients. Train (2003) shows that the random coefﬁcient model
has a duel interpretation as an error component model. Under this
representation, the mean of the random coefﬁcient can be interpreted
as a ﬁxed coefﬁcient— it is pinned down by variation in location choices
in response to variation in taxes faced by ﬁrms, conditional on other
observables included in the model. The standard deviation of the
random coefﬁcient is interpreted as a component in the error
term — it is pinned down by correlation in payoffs across locations
(both in a given choice set and across location decisions within a
given idea).
Berry and Haile (2010) have established that in random utility
multinomial logit models the distribution of unobserved preference
parameters is non-parametrically identiﬁed given sufﬁciently rich
micro data. However, non-parametric estimation of this model is
computationally burdensome, and we therefore follow most papers in
the literature by assuming payoffs are linear with independent additive
shocks and that the distribution of unobserved parameters is normally
distributed. These assumptions give us a convenient approximation.
The standard identiﬁcation concerns still apply here; to consistently
estimate the parameters we require that the additive shock (ϵpjt) and
the idea speciﬁc random terms (ηi and νi) are independent from each
other and from the other explanatory variables. Speciﬁcally, if there
are factors which inﬂuence location choice, and that are not captured
by the observed and unobserved controls that we include, this would
lead to inconsistent estimates. To mitigate this concern, we include a
number of controls in the model. We include location–industry–ﬁrm
size ﬁxed effects; these control for all country characteristics that affect
a ﬁrm's payoff and that do not vary through time, but that potentially do
vary across ﬁrms in different industries and different parent ﬁrm sizes.
We include time varying (non-tax) location characteristics. These
include a measure of the presence of real innovative activity associated
with the intellectual property. This controls for the fact that some ﬁrms,
for reasons other than the tax rate they will face in a particular location,
maywish to co-locate legal ownership of intellectual property with real
innovative activity. If decisions over the location of real innovative
activity are inﬂuenced by corporate tax rates, then failure to control
for this would result in an inconsistent estimate of the impact of tax
on patent location choice.We also control for the strength of intellectual
property rights protection in the location,market size and technological
innovativeness — all factors that vary over time and location, and may
be expected to impact on intellectual property location choices.
Identiﬁcation of the tax coefﬁcients also relies on the presence of
informative variation in taxes in the data; speciﬁcally we need to
observe variation in the set of taxes in potential locations across patent
choice situations, conditional on all other factors that inﬂuence location
choice. Crucially, it is necessary that there is variation in differences in
taxes between locations across choice sets. So, for instance, if the only
source of tax variation was that all tax rates changed simultaneouslyby the same amount, the marginal effect of tax on the payoffs would
not be identiﬁed.
Such variation arises in our framework for two reasons. First, there is
variation over time in statutory tax rates; as outlined below in Section 2,
over the period for which we have data (1985–2005) there has been a
general pattern of declining statutory tax rates. The size of this decline
has varied across countries, and the changes have occurred at different
times, meaning that tax reforms have given rise to variation in the set
of tax rates across locations. Second, in addition to this time series
variation, CFC regimes lead to another source of variation; two parent
ﬁrms taking a decision at the same point in time, but resident in
different countries, can face a different set of tax rates due to cross
country differences in CFC rules. The variation in location choices,
conditional on other factors, in response to this variation in tax rates
pins down the impact of tax on location choice.
3. Data
To estimate the model we need information on where ﬁrms have
chosen to locate the legal ownership of their patents, the corporate
tax regime and other conditioning variables.
3.1. Patents data
We use data on patent applications ﬁled at the European Patent
Ofﬁce (EPO) by the European andUS subsidiaries of parentﬁrms located
in fourteen European countries.We exclude fromour analysis ﬁrms that
patent infrequently. The number of patent applications by location of
the subsidiary that ﬁled the patent application is shown in Table 3.1.
Our data include 1083 parent ﬁrms that collectively have 4,823
patenting subsidiaries, which ﬁle 379,849 patent applications over the
period 1985–2005. These account for a 70% of all corporate applications
ﬁled at the EPO by ﬁrms parented in these fourteen European countries
during this period.
Each patent application lists the ﬁrm that ﬁles the application
(the applicant), this is the legal owner of the patent.4 We identify the
parent ﬁrm using information from company accounts (from Amadeus),
company websites, business directories and other sources (see
Abramovsky et al. (2008) for details). We use ownership information
at a ﬁxed point in time (2004), and we do not observe changes in
ownership after an application has been ﬁled.
For each patent application this gives us a mapping between the
location of the parent ﬁrm and the location of the subsidiary that
legally owns the patent. We also observe the location of the inventors
(individuals) that created the technology underlying the patent applica-
tion.5 There are often inventors located in multiple countries, and often
in different countries to that of the applicant.6 The location of both the
applicant and the inventors are distinct from the patent ofﬁce to
which the ﬁrm is applying for protection. For patent applications ﬁled
at the EPO, each application also designates the individual countries
in which ﬁnal patent protection will be sought; it is these individual
countries, not the EPO, that grants patent protection.
We use Thomson's Derwent database to classify patent applica-
tions based on the technology embodied in the patent and the
markets in which the technology is used. We use three broad indus-
try groups — Chemical, Electrical and Engineering. A patent applica-
tion can be relevant for more than one industry group if it has
applicability in more than one of these industries. Where this is
the case we include the patent application in each of the industry
Table 3.1
Patent applications and tax rates by applicant country.
Applicant country Number of patent
applications
% patent applications: Number of
rate changes
By industry By ﬁrm size High Statutory tax rate
Chemical Electrical Engineering Large Medium quality min max mean
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Belgium 6935 47.8 22.9 29.3 74.2 25.8 29.0 34.0 45.0 40.4 5
Denmark 4975 56.9 15.2 27.9 65.7 34.3 31.2 28.0 50.0 36.0 7
Finland 10151 13.9 72.6 13.5 83.1 16.9 33.8 25.0 60.2 36.8 7
France 50017 26.6 45.2 28.2 87.5 12.5 37.1 33.3 50.0 38.6 13
Germany 166606 29.1 34.3 36.6 78.5 21.5 35.8 38.3 61.7 52.5 15
Ireland 387 70.6 7.7 21.7 52.5 47.5 26.0 10.0 12.5 11.3 1
Italy 11155 34.1 26.3 39.5 47.9 52.1 29.9 37.3 53.2 44.6 7
Luxembourg 792 52.9 25.6 21.4 32.8 67.2 41.4 30.4 39.4 37.5 6
Netherlands 34918 29.3 51.4 19.3 90.2 9.8 36.1 31.5 43.0 37.2 4
Norway 1083 35.3 29.4 35.3 47.7 52.3 36.8 28.0 50.8 39.4 1
Spain 994 44.7 19.8 35.5 23.9 76.1 33.5 35.0 35.0 35.0 1
Sweden 17300 21.1 49.0 29.9 82.7 17.3 43.3 28.0 52.0 36.7 2
Switzerland 30221 45.6 23.7 30.7 73.8 26.2 39.6 21.3 28.5 25.1 6
United Kingdom 27955 45.0 30.0 25.0 67.3 32.7 38.2 30.0 40.0 33.8 5
United States 16360 48.7 29.9 21.4 88.6 11.4 37.9 34.0 49.5 40.1 5
Total 379849 32.3 36.8 30.8 78.8 21.2 36.5 10.0 61.7 43.2 6
Notes: Applicant country refers to the location of the subsidiary that is the applicant on a patent application. The ﬁnal row gives means across all patent applications in our data. Themean
tax rate in the ﬁnal row is averaged across all choice options, so it differs from Table 3.3.
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weight each patent application so that the sum of the weights equals
one (so if a patent application is in two industries it will get a weight
of 0.5 in each). Table 3.1 columns (2)–(4) shows the industry split of
patent applications, 32.3% are in Chemical, 36.8% in Electrical and
30.8% in Engineering, but this varies across countries. We restrict
our analysis to ﬁrms that are above the 20th percentile in terms of
the number of patent applications per ﬁrm in their industry. We dis-
tinguish large ﬁrms as those with a level of patenting above the 80th
percentile in their industry. 78.8% of patent applications in our sam-
ple are held by large ﬁrms.
Firms often take out a number of related patent applications at the
same time; we allow for correlation in these decisions. We group
together related patent applications that can be considered to be part
of the same idea. We identify patent applications as part of the same
idea if they are made by the same parent ﬁrm, are ﬁled in the same
quarter (i.e. three month period), are classiﬁed in the same industry
and share a network of common inventors. The number of patent
applications in an idea varies: on average an idea contains one patent
application; ideas containing more than one application account for
26% of all patent applications.
The importance of ideas in our empirical strategy is that we allow
correlation across patent applications at the level of the idea; the
decisions over where to locate ownership of these related patent
applications is unlikely to be independent, and the inclusion of random
coefﬁcients at this level allows for them to be correlated.
3.1.1. Patent quality
There is a large literature that highlights the skewness of patent
value and quality (Pakes (1985, 1986), Blundell et al. (1999), Lanjouw
and Schankerman (2004) and Hall et al. (2007)). Firms ﬁle patent
applications for a variety of reasons; some are ﬁled to protect valuable
new ideas, others are ﬁled strategically to provide option values or to
block competitors. Patent value also varies because some ideas are
commercially more valuable than others. We identify high quality
patent applications as those that are part of a triadic patent family, i.e.
a related patent application has been ﬁled at each of the EPO, the
US Patent and Trademark ofﬁce and the Japan Patent Ofﬁce. The
OECD uses triadic patent families “… to improve the international
comparability and quality of patent-based indicators … patents included
in the triadic family are typically of higher economic value: patentees
only take on the additional costs and delays of extending the protection oftheir invention to other countries if they deem it worthwhile.” (OECD,
2012).
We expect triadic patent applications to be of a higher value since
there is a cost to ﬁling patent applications at each of these patent ofﬁces,
and the main incentive to do this is if ﬁrms expect the technology to
have a wide application. Each idea (group of patent applications) is
classiﬁed as high quality if over half of the associatedpatent applications
are triadic. As seen in Table 3.1 (column (7)) on average 36.5% of patent
applications are classiﬁed as being part of a high quality idea.
3.1.2. Patent ownership and income from patents
We model the impact of tax on where ﬁrms choose to locate the
legal ownership of patents. In the introduction we discuss the reasons
that we might expect tax to affect a ﬁrm's decision of where to hold
legal ownership of intellectual property.
The extent to which ﬁrms have arranged their activities in such a
way that income can reasonably be deemed to be attributable to the
subsidiary that legally owns the intellectual property will differ; ﬁrms
will differ in how aggressively they seek to manage their tax liabilities.
For some ﬁrms, the choice of where to earn income may be a choice
between those countries in which real innovative activities already
takes place; others may employ strategies that allow them to earn
income in a separate country.
There are many factors that affect the costs and beneﬁts of choosing
a particular location. For tax havens these costs may be particularly
high: CFC rules are more likely to bind; the transfer of proﬁts to
locations where there is little real activity will be more difﬁcult; tax
havens are likely to be less attractive locations along non-tax dimen-
sions such as intellectual property rights protection. We would not
expect legal ownership of all patents to be located in such countries.
However, it is possible that some ﬁrms are particularly aggressive in
their tax planning and organise their activities in such a way that
income is earned in a location that is not where legal ownership is
located. We do not observe income ﬂows, so we do not explicitly
model this behaviour; to the extent that it makes the decision over
the location of legal ownership less related to taxwewould be less likely
to ﬁnd an impact of tax. In ourmodel we aim to capture this variation in
behaviour acrossﬁrms, andwithin ﬁrms across ideas, by the inclusion of
observed and unobserved heterogeneity.
An additional complicating factor is that a ﬁrm might ﬁle a patent
application from one subsidiary, but later transfer ownership of that
patent to another related ﬁrm. However, ﬁrms have an incentive to
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situations there are tax costs to transferring the ownership of intangible
assets. For there to be a tax beneﬁt to the sale or transfer of an asset it
must be the case that this can happen at a value below the true market
value. The transfer of intellectual property will be subject to transfer
pricing rules, which will act to limit how much value can be shifted to
a low tax country. In addition, many European countries operate exit
taxes that attempt to levy tax on the net present value of the expected
revenue stream on an intangible assetwhen it ismoved out of the coun-
try. Such tax provisions reduce (if not remove) any tax advantages to re-
locating to a lower tax jurisdiction. If ﬁrms do intend, with some
positive probability, to re-locate the ownership of a patent in the future,
and if transfer pricing rules and exit taxes do not act to perfectly off-set
any tax advantages of doing so, this would reduce the importance of
corporate tax in the initial location decision. This is an additional reason
that it is important that we allow heterogeneity in the importance of
corporate tax across intellectual property.
The place where we need to make more restrictive assumptions
about the relationship between legal ownership and income from
intellectual property is when we carry out the ex ante analysis of the
Patent Box tax reforms and calculate the revenue implications of these
reforms. In order to do this we need to assume that the relationship
between legal ownership and income is not changed by the policy
reform.
3.2. Taxes
We measure the impact of tax on payoffs using the statutory tax
rate. We assume that returns from intellectual property are expected
to be sufﬁciently high that deductions such as capital allowances are
relatively unimportant, so that the effective tax rate faced by the ﬁrm
is approximately the statutory tax rate (see Devereux and Grifﬁth
(2003), where Fig. 1 shows that the marginal effective tax rate
asymptotes to the statutory tax rate as proﬁtability increases).
Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on variation over time and across
countries in the tax rate. Table 3.1 (columns (8)–(11)) summarise the
variation in corporate tax rates. In general, main statutory tax rates fell
in the two decades up to 2005, but with the timings of changes differing
across countries. The Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Finland,
Norway and Sweden – reduced tax rates signiﬁcantly around 1990.
Italy enacted a reduction of over 10 percentage points in 1998, as did
Germany in 2001. France and the UK have enacted a series of gradual
reductions.
There can be additional tax levied in the parent ﬁrm's home country
as a result of Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules, which aim to
prevent ﬁrms locating income in lower tax countries in order to avoidTable 3.2
Number of ﬁrms and CFC regimes by parent ﬁrm country.
Patent ﬁrm
country
Number of
parent ﬁrms
CFC regime
introduced
Belgium 28 –
Denmark 27 1995
Finland 25 1995
France 108 1980
Germany 446 1972
Ireland 4 –
Italy 75 2002
Luxembourg 8 –
Netherlands 58 –
Norway 7 1992
Spain 8 1996
Sweden 48 1990
Switzerland 106 –
United Kingdom 135 1984
Notes: Country codes: Belgium (BE); Switzerland (CH); Denmark (DK); Finland (FI); France (
(NO); Spain (ES); Sweden (SE); United Kingdom (GB).taxation in their home country. CFC rules set out criteria for identifying
subsidiaries that are located in a country deemed to be ‘low-tax’ and
earning a signiﬁcant amount of ‘passive income’ (income that is not
associated with real activity). When a CFC regime is in place in a parent
ﬁrm's country of residence, and a subsidiary is located in a country that
is deemed a ‘low tax’ location (as judged against parent ﬁrm country
speciﬁc thresholds), thenwe set the tax variable, τfjt, equal to the parent
ﬁrm country's statutory rate. A description of the country pairs for
which this is the case is given in Table 3.2. There is variation in whether
a parent ﬁrm country operates a CFC regime (some regimes are
introduced during the period for which we have data) and in the
applicant countries that are deemed low tax (which differ over time
when statutory rates change). This deﬁnition of whether CFC rules
bind effectively assumes that the income received from a patent is
deemed to be passive income, and that the share of passive income is
sufﬁcient to trigger the CFC rules. This is clearly an approximation.
However, if we look across all location options that ﬁrms in our data
face and that are deemed low tax by CFC regimes, then it is rarely the
case that the parent ﬁrm has both inventors and holds legal ownership
of a patent application in the same location. The results we present
below are robust to the alternative assumption that patent applications
with ownership located in countries where associated real innovative
activity is also located would be treated as active income, so that CFC
rules do not bind.3.3. Descriptive statistics
The variables included in the model are deﬁned and summarised in
Table 3.3. The top panel contains the observed location attributes we
include. These comprise the tax rate that the parent ﬁrm would face if
it earned income from the application of intellectual property in the
location, a measure of the presence of real innovative activity in a
location deﬁned as an indicator of whether at least one of the inventors
associated with the patent applications that form the idea are located in
that country and country-time varying observable characteristics. The
latter includes a measure of intellectual property rights protection.
This is based on a measure developed by Ginarte and Park (1997) and
Park (2008). The countries we consider all have advanced systems of
property rights and therefore rank relatively highly on the protection
of intellectual property.We deﬁne a country as having a strong intellec-
tual property regime if it scores above the median of countries in our
sample. Other country-time varying variables include market size, as
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the technological
innovativeness of a country, proxied by business R&D investment in
the country as a share of GDP.Applicant countries for which CFC ever binds
(no. of years)
–
FI (1 year), IE (all years)
IE (11 years)
CH (6 years), IE (all years)
CH (all years), FI (8 years), GB (1 year), IE (all years), NO (9), SE (10)
–
–
–
–
IE (14 years)
CH (7 years), FI (2 years), IE (all years)
CH (1 year). IE (11 years)
–
CH (2 years), IE (all years)
FR); Germany (DE); Ireland (IE); Italy (IT); Luxembourg (LU); Netherlands (NL); Norway
Table 3.3
Variable deﬁnitions and summary statistics.
Variable Deﬁnition Min Max Mean Standard deviation
Location characteristics
Tax rate (τfjt) Statutory tax rate in applicant country; or statutory tax rate
in parent ﬁrm county when binding CFC regime
10.00 61.70 41.79 11.34
Real activity Dummy equal to one when any of the inventors associated
with the patent applications that form an idea are located in that country
0.00 1.00 0.86 0.35
Strong intellectual property protection Measure of applicant countries' relative degree of intellectual
property rights protection
0.00 1.00 0.76 0.43
Market size GDP measured in millions of constant PPP US dollars 0.01 12.56 1.90 1.97
Technological innovativeness Business investment in R&D as a share of GDP 0.29 3.20 1.53 0.40
Patent characteristics
Large ﬁrm Large parent ﬁrms are those for which the total number of patent
applications is above the 80th percentile
0.00 1.00 0.79 0.41
High quality Ideas are classiﬁed as high quality if over half of the associated patent
applications were ﬁled at each of the EPO, USPTO and JPO
0.00 1.00 0.36 0.48
Electrical Instrumentation, computer, electronics, communications, electrical 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.42
Chemical Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, printing, petroleum 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.42
Engineering General and mechanical engineering 0.00 1.00 0.31 0.38
Notes: Statistics are based on all patent applications in our data. GDP ismeasured in constant PPPUS dollars (expendituremeasure) using a 2005base year. Business Investment inR&D as a
share of GDP (BERD) is from OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators. GDP and BERD are available at http://stats.oecd.org.
19R. Grifﬁth et al. / Journal of Public Economics 112 (2014) 12–23We allow the valuations ﬁrms place on location characteristics to
vary across patent applications. A summary of observable patent
(or idea) characteristics is given in the bottom panel of Table 3.3. In
estimation we allow all coefﬁcients to vary with the industry the patent
application belongs to and the size of the associated parent ﬁrm. This
allows the model to capture, for example, that large ﬁrms are more
likely to have organisational structures that assist the location of
intellectual property for tax purposes. The tax rate is interacted with a
measure of the idea quality, reﬂecting the possibility that ﬁrms' location
choices may be more responsive to tax when they expect intellectual
property to earn higher returns.4. Results
Table 4.1 shows the estimated coefﬁcients of the choice model
outlined in Section 2. Themodel is estimated using simulatedmaximum
likelihood (see Train (2003)). We allow all coefﬁcients to vary across
industry and ﬁrms size, indicated by the different columns. We include
a full set of location–industry–ﬁrm size ﬁxed effects (not reported in
Table 4.1, but available upon request).
The top row of Table 4.1 shows that the mean marginal impact of
tax on the payoff from placing legal ownership of a patent in a loca-
tion is negative and statistically signiﬁcant across all industries and
parent ﬁrm size groups. The second row shows that in both the elec-
trical and engineering industries the payoff for high quality patents
is more sensitive to taxes. This is true both for large and medium
ﬁrms. In the chemical industry the payoff for a high quality patent
is estimated to be marginally less responsive to tax than for lower
quality patents for large ﬁrms, with there being no statistically
signiﬁcant difference between the high and low quality patents for
medium ﬁrms. Row three shows that there is a substantial degree
of unobserved heterogeneity in the importance of tax on location
choice across ideas, the standard deviations of the random coefﬁ-
cients on tax are both large and statistically signiﬁcant across all
industries and size categories.
The fourth row shows that, ceteris paribus, having real innova-
tive activity in a location is associated with a higher payoff from
placing legal ownership of a patent in that location across all indus-
tries and size categories; the ﬁfth row shows that there is a signiﬁ-
cant amount of variation in the importance of this characteristic
across ideas.Together the large and statistically signiﬁcant standard deviations
on the random coefﬁcients on tax and real innovative activity (in all
industry-ﬁrm size groups) indicates the presence of important correla-
tions in payoffs, both across locations for a given patent, and across
patents in a given idea. These correlationswill generate patterns of sub-
stitution that will depart from themore restrictive patterns implied by a
standard multinomial logit model.
The remaining three rows of Table 4.1 describe the impact of
having strong intellectual property protection, and the marginal
impacts of market size and technological innovativeness, on the
payoff function. For ﬁve of the six industry-ﬁrm size groups, a loca-
tion having strong intellectual property protection is, all else equal,
associated with ﬁrms obtaining higher payoffs from locating legal
ownership of their patents there (the exception is medium electric
ﬁrms, for which the strong intellectual property rights dummy is
negative). Larger market size is associated with statistically signiﬁ-
cantly larger payoffs for ﬁve of the size industry-ﬁrm size groups,
and a higher degree of technological innovativeness is associated
with statistically signiﬁcantly larger payoffs for four of the size
industry-ﬁrm size groups.
Table 4.2 shows the matrix of own and cross tax elasticities
implied by the choice model. It contains the elasticities of the
share of patents located in each of 14 European countries with
respect to the rate of corporate tax set in each of these countries
and in the US. These are calculated as described in Section 2. We
report the matrix of elasticities using tax rates and the distribution
of patent applications for the most recent year in our data, 2005.
Each cell shows the elasticity of the share of patents located in the
country indicated in column 1 with respect to the tax rate set by
the country in row 1. The emboldened diagonal shows the own tax
elasticities. For all locations, except Luxembourg, the own tax
elasticities are less than one in magnitude.
There is a limited literature on the elasticity of the location of corpo-
rate income with respect to tax. De Mooij and Ederveen (2008) report
that empirical studies considering the effect of differences in statutory
tax rates on various measures of proﬁtability (with a view to indirectly
capturing the effects on proﬁt shifting) tend to ﬁnd a semi-elasticity of
around −1.2. As in this paper, Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) consider
the link between corporate tax rates and patent applications. They
estimate a semi-elasticity that, depending on the functional form of
their model, implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the rate of
corporate tax translates into a 3.5%–3.8% fall in patent applications
Table 4.1
Estimated parameters.
Industry Electrical Engineering Chemical
Size Large Medium Large Medium Large Medium
Tax rate (mean) −3.48 −4.93 −4.91 −4.88 −6.54 −4.03
(0.13) (0.32) (0.14) (0.24) (0.13) (0.28)
Tax rate x quality −0.67 −1.98 −0.69 −0.66 0.34 0.08
(0.14) (0.37) (0.15) (0.28) (0.14) (0.31)
Tax rate (std. dev.) 3.59 3.67 2.35 3.17 3.36 4.24
(0.16) (0.40) (0.23) (0.27) (0.15) (0.27)
Real activity (mean) 5.60 7.27 6.20 7.03 6.11 6.55
(0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09)
Real activity (stand. dev) 2.50 2.76 2.80 2.96 2.95 2.59
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)
High IP property protection 0.63 −0.22 0.28 0.19 0.68 0.60
(0.04) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.10)
GDP −0.20 0.66 0.53 0.43 0.39 0.20
(0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05)
R&D expenditure/GDP 0.26 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.18 0.00
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Notes: The dependent variable is location choice in one of the locations shown in Table 3.1. Estimation is based on 379,849 patent applications. Industry–location–ﬁrm size ﬁxed effects
included. Large ﬁrms are those associated with a total number of patent applications above the 80th percentile in each industry.
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by the fact that our model allows tax effects to vary across all locations.
We ﬁnd that the share of patents held in Luxembourg is most sensitive
to tax (the Luxembourg semi-elasticity is 3.9%) and least sensitive for
Germany (the German semi-elasticity is 0.5%).7
Theoretically, we might expect smaller countries to have rela-
tively high own tax elasticities, as a change in their tax rate will
not affect the market rate of return, making the cost of capital
more responsive to tax changes (see Wilson (1999)). This may be
one of the reasons that such countries are more likely to compete
for corporate income using low rates; a change in the rate leads to
a larger change in the relatively small tax base (see, for example,
Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2007)). The own tax elasticities in Table 4.2
show some evidence of this; they are higher for the Benelux countries
than for France and Germany.
The importance of allowing for observed heterogeneity and
correlation in locations' payoffs can be seen by looking at the cross tax
elasticities. In a multinomial logit with no observed or unobserved het-
erogeneity all cross tax elasticities in a column would be the same — a
reduction in the tax rate in location A would lead to patent applications
switching from other locations in proportion to their original shares.
This implausibly restrictive pattern of substitution is not imposed in
our more ﬂexible model, meaning that elasticities vary substantially
within a column. In particular, our model allows the data to capture
the fact that ﬁrms aremore likely to choose to switch between locations
with similar characteristics (whether that be because the ﬁrm has in-
ventors located in several locations, or because locations have similar
tax rates).5. Policy simulations
One of the advantages of estimating themodel outlined above is that
it captures patterns of substitution across locations, and it therefore7 Note that in Table 3.2 we adopt of the convention of reporting tax elasticities. Roughly
speaking these can be interpreted as telling us the % change in the share of patents in lo-
cation A associated with a 1% change in the rate of tax in location B. These can readily be
converted to semi-elasticities (which, roughly speaking, tells us the % change in the share
of patents in location A associated with a 1 percentage point change in the rate of tax in
location B) by dividing by the appropriate tax rate. So for instance the 2005 rate of corpo-
rate tax in Germanywas 38.3% and the German own tax elasticity is 0.201. Hence the Ger-
man own tax semi-elasticity is given by 100 × (0.201 / 38.3) = 0.52%.allows us to simulate counterfactual policy situations. We illustrate
this by considering a recent set of policy reforms.
A number of European countries have introduced polices that
offer substantially reduced rates of corporation tax on the income
derived from patents, and in some cases other forms of intellectual
property (these are often called Patent Boxes). Firms are able to
declare that some portion of their proﬁts are derived from either
the use or licence of patents, and these proﬁts are taxed at a lower
rate. Patent Box rules differ across countries, for example, in terms
of how eligible income is measured, how the rules that apply
when calculating how much income can be allocated to patents,
and how the related expenses are treated.8 None of the countries
require that the R&D underlying the intellectual property took
place in that country, as this is not permissible under European law.
We use the most recent year of our data (2005) to simulate the
impact of the two sets of policies. First we consider the introduction of
Patent Boxes in the Benelux countries, and second the later introduction
in the UK.We simulate the impact of these policies on the share of new
patents for which legal ownership is placed in each of these countries
using the choice model presented above. For illustrative purposes, we
assume that the total level of patenting activity by European ﬁrms is
not affected by the policy reforms. We also consider the impact of
these policy reforms on tax revenue; this requires the further assump-
tion that the relationship between where tax is levied and the location
of legal ownership is not altered by the policy reform.
The policies are summarised in Table 5.1. In 2007 Belgium intro-
duced a Patent Box that reduced the tax rate on income derived from
patents from 34% to 6.8%, and the Netherlands introduced a Patent
Box that reduced the rate from 31.5% to 10%. In 2008 Luxembourg
reduced the rate from 30.4% to 5.9%. The UK government introduced a
Patent Box at the rate of 10% in 2013; the main rate of corporate tax in
the UK was 30% in 2005, but had fallen to 24% by 2013. We simulate
the impact of the reduction from 30% to the Patent Box rate.9
Table 5.2 sets out the results of these simulations for the four
locations that introduced Patent Boxes.10 A note of caution in
interpreting these results is that the lowest tax rate we observe in the8 Evers et al. (2013) provide further details on the policies and incorporate the rules into
effective tax rates.
9 For further discussion of the UK Patent Box see Grifﬁth and Miller (2010, 2011). A
number of other European countries (Cyprus, Liechtenstein, Malta, Spain, and the Swiss
canton of Nidwalden) have since introduced similar policies.
10 The full set of results, including the impact on other countries, is available on request.
Table 4.2
Own and cross price elasticities of locations with respect to statutory tax rates.
Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Norway Spain Sweden Switzerland UK US
Belgium −0.569 0.010 0.018 0.085 0.174 0.001 0.016 0.006 0.079 0.003 0.003 0.030 0.036 0.025 0.038
Denmark 0.016 −0.410 0.015 0.044 0.145 0.000 0.013 0.007 0.060 0.003 0.004 0.033 0.047 0.025 0.037
Finland 0.015 0.008 −0.465 0.096 0.190 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.103 0.002 0.002 0.046 0.031 0.021 0.043
France 0.013 0.004 0.017 −0.311 0.118 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.052 0.001 0.001 0.017 0.017 0.011 0.021
Germany 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.032 −0.201 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.035 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.016 0.008 0.012
Ireland 0.048 0.031 0.033 0.103 0.279 −0.404 0.063 0.017 0.162 0.007 0.009 0.048 0.176 0.054 0.352
Italy 0.011 0.006 0.012 0.041 0.095 0.001 −0.373 0.004 0.043 0.002 0.002 0.017 0.035 0.019 0.017
Luxembourg 0.062 0.040 0.029 0.126 0.450 0.002 0.055 −1.197 0.125 0.012 0.019 0.058 0.093 0.073 0.079
Netherlands 0.022 0.010 0.034 0.094 0.234 0.001 0.017 0.004 −0.569 0.003 0.003 0.037 0.039 0.027 0.048
Norway 0.036 0.022 0.030 0.095 0.279 0.001 0.030 0.013 0.099 −0.783 0.009 0.082 0.070 0.046 0.050
Spain 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.032 0.097 0.000 0.012 0.008 0.047 0.003 −0.336 0.017 0.007 0.016 0.010
Sweden 0.017 0.012 0.032 0.066 0.166 0.000 0.015 0.003 0.078 0.004 0.002 −0.432 0.033 0.026 0.033
Switzerland 0.023 0.017 0.024 0.086 0.282 0.001 0.028 0.006 0.093 0.004 0.003 0.036 −0.278 0.029 0.049
UK 0.014 0.008 0.013 0.038 0.106 0.000 0.015 0.004 0.053 0.002 0.002 0.024 0.018 −0.321 0.030
Notes: Each cell contains the elasticity of the share of patent applications in the country indicated in column 1when the tax rate changes in the country in row 1. Numbers are calculated
using tax rates and patent applications in 2005.
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level, and so are outside the observed range of taxes in our data.
We carry out the simulation on the full set of patent applications,
shown in the top panel. It may be the case that many patents do not
earnmuch income, and so in the bottom panel we carry out the simula-
tion using only the high quality patents, under the assumption that
these are the patents that are expected to earn the highest income.
The estimates suggest that the location of these patentswere on average
more sensitive to tax.
The ﬁrst column shows the actual share of patent applications in
each location in 2005 (prior to the introduction of Patent Boxes). The
second column shows the predicted share of patent applications in
each location after the introduction of Benelux Patent Boxes. The
standard error of these predicted shares are shown in parenthesis. The
third column expresses the % change from column 1 to column 2. The
introduction of Patent Boxes in the Benelux countries leads to a large
and statistically signiﬁcant increase in the share of new patents whose
legal ownership is located in Belgium and Netherlands. The increase in
Luxembourg is proportionally large, but is not statistically signiﬁcant.
There is no change in the share in the UK. There is a decline in the
share of patent applications located in other non-Patent Box locations
(not shown).
The fourth column shows the predicted shares after the introduction
of the UK Patent Box (in addition to the Benelux Patent Boxes). The ﬁfth
column shows the % changes from column 1 to column 4. The UK Patent
Box leads to a reduction in the share of newpatent applicationsmade by
subsidiaries located in the Benelux countries, but for Belgium and the
Netherlands they still have a statistically signiﬁcantly higher share
than prior to the introduction of any Patent Boxes. The share of new
patent applications made by subsidiaries located in the UK increasesTable 5.1
Patent Box regimes.
Applicant country Year introduced Patent Box
(1) (2)
Belgium 2007 Applies to gross income from patents and supplem
Luxembourg 2008 Applies to net income from patents and some other
Netherlands 2007 Applies to net income from patents and some other
United Kingdom 2013 Applies to net income derived from patents and sim
Notes: Effective Patent Box rates are those that were in place when the policy was ﬁrst introdu
include licence and embedded income. Policies differ in the conditions underwhich acquired int
European countries now also operate policies akin to a Patent Box, and a similar policy has beeby a statistically and economically signiﬁcant amount. The results with
high quality patents are similar.
In columns (6)–(8) of Table 5.2 we consider the impact on tax
revenue from income derived from patents. These combine two effects.
The reduction in the statutory tax rate will reduce revenue, but the
increase in the share of income from patents will increase it. We
demonstrate the impact on tax revenue by computing the product of
the statutory tax rate in each country and the share of patent applica-
tions. We index this to 100 before the introduction of any Patent
Boxes. In the upper panel of the table we assume that all patents are
equally valuable, and that the relationship between legal ownership
and taxable income is not affected by the reform. All countries experi-
ence a decline in revenue. Although the countries that introduce Patent
Boxes attract more new patents, the increased share is not sufﬁcient to
outweigh the effect of the lower tax rate. With all four Patent Box
policies in place, revenues are less than half of their previous levels in
these countries. Ernst et al. (2013) provide evidence that lower rates
of tax on patent income attract particularly innovative projects with
high earning potential. In the lower panel we consider the effect on
revenue when we consider only high quality patents. The picture is
here is similar; the introduction of Patent Boxes results in a substantial
reduction in revenues.
6. Summary and conclusion
The literature has emphasised the downward pressure on corporate
income tax rates that arises from factor mobility. There is also a large
literature that discusses the strategies ﬁrms use to shift income for tax
purposes and to circumvent anti-avoidance rules, and that highlights
an important role for intangible assets. However, we know relativelyEffective rate
(3)
entary certiﬁcates 6.8%
forms of intellectual property 5.9%
forms of intellectual property. Policy substantially broadened in 2010. 10%
ilar types of intellectual property. 10%
ced. Each policy is associated with criteria that deﬁne which income is eligible. All policies
ellectual property is eligible. Net and Gross refers to development costs. A number of other
n proposed in the US.
Table 5.2
Impact of Patent Boxes on location of and tax revenue raised from new patents.
Share of new patent applications Tax revenue
Prereform Benelux Patent Boxes % change UK Patent Box % change Prereform Benelux Patent Boxes UK Patent Box
All patents
Belgium 2.39 3.53 47.6% 3.42 −3.1% 100 30 29
(0.34) (0.34)
Luxembourg 0.33 0.60 83.9% 0.56 −7.0% 100 36 33
(0.34) (0.34)
Netherlands 7.92 12.51 58.0% 12.16 −2.8% 100 50 49
(0.38) (0.38)
UK 4.15 4.15 −0.1% 5.25 26.6% 100 100 42
(0.31) (0.32)
High quality patents
Belgium 1.90 3.29 73.2% 3.17 −3.9% 100 35 33
(0.35) (0.35)
Luxembourg 0.42 0.76 82.8% 0.71 −7.3% 100 35 33
(0.35) (0.35)
Netherlands 7.00 12.48 78.3% 12.09 −3.1% 100 57 55
(0.39) (0.38)
UK 4.89 4.39 −10.2% 5.64 28.5% 100 90 38
(0.31) (0.33)
Notes: The top panel provides numbers based on all patent applications; the bottom panel provides numbers on high quality patents only. Column 1 shows the actual share of patent
applications in each location; columns 2 and 4 give the predicted share of patent applications in each location following the introduction of the Benelux Patent Boxes and following the
additional introduction of the UK Patent Box. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Column 3 and 5 show the corresponding percent changes in shares relative to column 1. The ﬁnal
three columns show revenue raised from new patents, assuming that all patents have equal expected values. Revenues are indexed to 100 in the pre Patent Box period. Numbers are
based on simulations using data for 2005.
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responds to tax. The evidence there is on the impact of tax on the
location of capital more generally has tended to suffer from the imposi-
tion of restrictive a priori assumptions placed on the underlying model
of ﬁrm behaviour. From a policy perspective it is clearly important to
understand how responsive ﬁrms are to corporate income taxes when
they make location decisions.
In this paper, we estimate a model of ﬁrms' decisions over where to
locate the legal ownership of their patents. We ﬁnd that corporate tax
rates are an important determinant of location choice. We extend
the current literature on the determinants of ﬁrm location choice by
estimating a ﬂexible choice model, which accounts for both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity in behaviour. We are able to generate
own and cross tax elasticities across locations that capture complex
patterns of substitution in the data. The model can be used to conduct
ex ante analysis of policy changes. We ﬁnd that this heterogeneity is
important for explaining location choices.
Our model also shows that other factors inﬂuence where ﬁrms
choose to hold legal ownership of patents. For instance, ﬁrms are
more likely to locate patent ownership in countries where they have
associated real innovative activity. Thismay reﬂect co-location external-
ities, or the inﬂuence of tax rules which seek to limit the extent towhich
income and real innovative activity can be geographically separated.
Firms also value other non-tax location characteristics. Such factors,
along with tax rules like the operation of CFC regimes that limit the
tax advantages of locating patent ownership in low tax jurisdictions,
help explain why we do not see ﬁrms choosing to hold all legal
ownership of patents in the lowest tax locations.
We use the model to consider the impact of the recent introduction
of preferential tax regimes for income from patents. These Patent Boxes
are likely to attract patent income, but our estimates suggest that
they will also lead to substantial falls in tax revenues. Of course
some of this revenue loss might be offset by gains from attracting
activities that yielded positive externalities; these would need to
be taken into account in a calculation of the welfare impact of
the policy. It is also possible that the tax reforms will affect ﬁrms'
decisions over whether to apply for a patent on a new technology
or whether to rely on secrecy. We do not have information thatwould allow us to directly estimate this margin, but this would be
an interesting avenue for future research.
The introduction of Patent Boxes by several European countries in a
relatively short space of time has given rise to concerns that countries
are engaging in tax competition for patent income. In future work we
intend to build on the framework developed here to consider whether
governments are engaged in a strategic game to attract income from
intellectual policy that ultimately will continue to exert downward
pressure on corporate taxes.Acknowledgments
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